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SWEDEN HAS BEEN regarded as a relatively 
passive party in Barents cooperation 
compared to its Nordic neighbours. Several 
reasons can be found for this.
Sweden has no direct border with 
Russia, unlike Finland and Norway, and thus 
has fewer matters of common interest with 
the big power in the East. Foreign policy in 
Sweden is directed more to the south and to 
the southeast, that is, the EU community and 
the Baltic region. The Finnish and Norwegian 
capitals, as well as the countries’ official 
political and administrative structures, have 
more of a focus on the Barents than is the 
case in Sweden. After a starting period, 
only very small financial and administrative 
resources have been allocated to Barents 
cooperation from the Swedish side. The 
politicians and the press are comparatively 
ignorant of Barents realities, and Barents 
issues are very rarely covered by the Swedish 
media, with the sole exception of Swedish 
radio in northern Sweden.
At the beginning of Barents cooperation, 
Swedish involvement was higher. Former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson 
was very much influenced by his Norwegian 
friend Thorvald Stoltenberg, “the father of 
Barents cooperation”. During Andersson’s 
time in the Foreign Office (1985-1991), we 
saw city twinning and county cooperation 
started between northern Sweden and 
North-West Russia. Sweden channelled quite 
a lot of its foreign aid budget across a wide 
range of sectors to projects for bilateral 
cooperation with Russia after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the communist system.
After Vladimir Putin came into power and 
the Russian economy improved, the support 
programmes were largely dismantled. They 
have continued, albeit on a much more 
modest level, within the two programmes 
of the Northern Dimension of the European 
Union, namely, the Environmental and the 
Social and Health Care partnerships. Very little 
money has been left for bilateral cooperation 
between the two countries to promote 
democracy, human rights and empowerment 
of civil society.
WHY HAS SWEDISH involvement in Barents 
cooperation gradually declined? One reason 
on the Russian side is the improvement of 
the economy, which has made the country 
more self-sufficient. Another reason is the 
Putin regime’s sharply reduced interest in 
cooperation with the West; this has even 
become a more hostile attitude, seen in, 
among other things, the introduction of new 
laws that restrict civic organisations’ space to 
act and cooperate with partners abroad.
However, interest on the part of the 
Swedish government has also diminished. 
In two of his first speeches, Göran Persson, 
as new prime minister in 1996, specifically 
mentioned Barents cooperation. That never 
happens when Prime Minister Fredrik 
Reinfeldt or Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Carl Bildt is speaking.  In addition, Barents 
cooperation is no longer cited in the 
annual foreign policy statements which the 
government presents to Parliament.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh 
– assassinated in September 2003 – was 
probably the last leading Swedish politician 
with a fairly deep interest in Barents 
cooperation. She played a key role when 
a lot of international money was collected 
and an agreement reached with Russia to 
combat nuclear waste and risks on the Kola 
Peninsula.
So what is left? Is there any light at the 
end of the tunnel?
There are still committed actors who 
want to develop Barents cooperation in 
their fields. Some of the promising examples 
that can provide us with new hopes are the 
Barents Press Network; the cooperation 
among indigenous peoples, young 
entrepreneurs, youth, schools and, to some 
extent, universities; the cooperation in the 
area of culture and sports; and the Barents 
Reunion Forums, which have been organised 
in Haparanda-Tornio for seven years now, 
sponsored by IKEA owner Ingvar Kamprad.
WHAT WE ARE LACKING in Sweden is a 
more comprehensive and programme-
oriented approach that activates politicians, 
government, the media and a greater 
number of civil society actors and that 
encourages people-to-people contacts. The 
cooperation needs more visible ideological 
and propagandistic leaders!
I interviewed Thorvald Stoltenberg and 
Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkki 
Tuomioja in conjunction with the twentieth 
anniversary of Barents cooperation in 
January 2013. We have not achieved the 
economic and business objectives that 
were part of the dreams in the start-up 
years.  Stoltenberg and Tuomioja regarded 
overcoming the dividing line with Russia 
as still the most burning challenge of our 
endeavours. 
More can be done, even if realities such 
as the changed domestic and foreign policy 
of Russia create new problems and obstacles. 
Hopefully, the  ongoing Arctic cooperation 
can provide new inspiration and attract 
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